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Abstract: A long tradition of studies in political science has unveiled the effects of 
electoral institutions on party systems and parliamentary representation. Yet, their 
effects on campaign activities remain overlooked. Research in this tradition still 
lacks a strong comparative element able to explore the nuanced role that electoral 
institutions play in shaping individual-level campaigns during first-order 
parliamentary elections. We use data from a variety of national candidate studies to 
address this lacuna, showing that the electoral mobilisation efforts put in place by 
candidates are affected by the structure of the electoral institutions. Candidate-
centred electoral systems propel higher mobilisation efforts, in terms of both 
campaign intensity and complexity. Moreover, we find that candidate-centred 
electoral systems shift the campaign focus towards individuals more than parties. By 
directly addressing the effects of electoral institutions on campaign behaviour, our 
study contributes to the wider debate on their role in promoting political engagement 
and mobilisation. The implications of our results concern the effects of electoral 
institutions on political competition, indicating that the extent to which electoral 
institutions impact upon it go well beyond what has been shown to date.  
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Introduction 
Electoral institutions matter for a multiplicity of features of political life. The 
literature on electoral systems ± specifically on their systemic effects ± has 
extensively explored the consequences of electoral mechanisms on proportionality, 
the number of existing parties, the representation of minorities and women, etc.2 
Moreover, electoral institutions have been shown to shape the behaviour of voters, 
with regard to their likelihood of turning out to vote as well as vote choice.3 Finally, 
a significant body of research suggests that the behaviour of elected representatives 
is also affected by electoral mechanisms.4 Equally, the behaviour of parliamentary 
candidates should be shaped by the same institutions. In this article, we extend our 
understanding of electoral institutions and how they structure political competition 
by exploring their effect on the campaign activities of parliamentary candidates in 
the run up to first-order parliamentary elections. We do so by relying on a unique, 
pooled dataset of candidate studies from countries that employ a diverse range of 
electoral mechanisms. 
 
To date, most studies of electoral campaigns during first-order parliamentary 
elections have been based on single systems, lacking an understanding of the role 
that electoral institutions play in the process. At the same time, contributions about 
the effects of electoral systems are concerned with their systemic effects much more 
than with their potential impact on the behaviour of political elites. In this study, we 
bridge these two traditions in order to enhance our understanding of elite behaviour, 
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which fundamentally impacts on the extent to which citizens are exposed to 
campaign stimuli. Therefore, while directly addressing the scholarly literature on 
campaign behaviour, our study also contributes to the wider debate on the role of 
electoral institutions in promoting political engagement and mobilisation. 
 
The novel data brought about by an extensive cross-sectional collection of candidate 
studies ± we combine data from the Comparative Candidates Study (CCS) with 
compatible survey data from other countries ± enable us to better grasp the 
multifaceted phenomena of political campaign. In particular, we disentangle the 
extent to which FDQGLGDWHV¶ LQGLYLGXDO-level campaign effort varies under different 
electoral set ups. We do so by looking at the overall campaign effort put in place by 
candidates in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections, focusing on both its 
intensity as well as complexity. We find that under candidate-centred electoral 
institutions ± for example, single member district plurality (SMD), open list 
proportional representation (PR), and single transferable vote PR (PR-STV) ±
FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUWWHQGVWREHPRUHLQWHQVHand complex than under party-
centred mechanisms such as closed list PR. This ± while intrinsically intuitive ± goes 
against what has been found to be the case to date, 5 and indicates that the impact of 
electoral institutions is more far-reaching than what the state of the art describes. 
Next to that, we shed further light on the relationship between individual candidates 
and their party by assessing how electoral institutions influence the FDQGLGDWHV¶
campaign focus. Not surprisingly, the extent to which the FDQGLGDWHV¶ campaign 
messages focus on themselves versus their party is also dependent on the structure of 
the electoral incentives, ceteris paribus. In addition, we find that candidates 
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campaign harder when the district magnitude is smaller.6 All in all, the amount and 
type of campaign stimuli that voters are likely to experience is closely related to the 
electoral institutions.  
 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, we survey the literature that 
we touch upon to guide our investigation. We then outline our expectations, describe 
the data and the operationalisation of the variables in use. This is followed by a 
presentation and discussion of the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude by 
summarising our findings and evaluating their implications. 
 
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Campaigns 
Partisan dealignment, societal and technological changes have jointly contributed to 
shaping the nature of electoral campaigns. As the number of floating voters7 as well 
as late-deciders8 who can be influenced and persuaded in the run up to an election 
keeps rising, so does the scholarly attention paid to campaign mobilisation.9  
 
In defining the very concept of an electoral campaign, Farrell and Webb claim that 
there is an obvious relationship between the nature of electoral campaigns and 
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institutional settings.10  Empirical tests to corroborate this claim are, as yet, very 
scarce. Evidence comes mostly from the voters¶ perspective: several studies suggest 
that electoral institutions can play a significant role in shaping the extent to which 
voters experience campaign stimuli.11 The claim that electoral institutions influence 
campaign mobilisation is essentially uncontested in this literature. Nevertheless, 
disagreement does exist on whether PR systems stimulate electioneering more than 
plurality, with reasonable arguments provided by both camps. On the one hand, PR 
systems involve a larger number of competitors, which tends to increase overall 
campaign activity and produce competitive contexts characterised by extensive 
campaign efforts. On the other hand, lower turnout ± typical of plurality systems ± 
boosts the level of mobilisation in the run up to a vote. However, these two divergent 
theses share the common assumption that electoral institutions play a role in shaping 
campaign activity, which in turn affects electoral participation. Karp and colleagues 
systematically tested these competing hypotheses and disentangled the matter by 
relying on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) as well as 
national election studies.12 Consistently, across both types of data sources, they find 
that voters are more likely to experience higher degrees of campaign stimuli in 
candidate-based electoral systems. Further to this, the representation literature has 
provided evidence that plurality systems affect the style of representation by MPs, 
making them highly responsive to their constituents and somewhat less partisan.13 It 
is reasonable, therefore, to expect differences across electoral institutions to also 
                                                        
10
 Farrell and Webb 2000, 7. 
11
 Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008. 
12
 Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Karp and Banducci 2007. 
13
 Olivella and Tavits 2014. 
 6 
shape the behaviour of parliamentary candidates. After all, public representatives 
have been campaigning before the election and most likely will run again.  
 
Conversely, the few studies that have investigated it from the candidateV¶ perspective 
± in the context of the second-order European elections ± have not found such an 
uncontested link between the electoral institutions and campaign effort. Bowler and 
Farrell explore the nexus between electoral systems and campaign activity by using 
2006 MEP survey data,14 to find no evidence of electoral institutions affecting levels 
of campaign effort.15 They conclude that electoral institutions affect campaign goals, 
but fail to play a distinct role in structuring the campaign effort. Moreover, Giebler 
and Wüst, studying the 2009 European election, find no evidence that electoral 
systems shape the intensity RIFDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQeffort (money or time), and only 
a partial indication that they influence FDQGLGDWHV¶ choice of campaign tools.16 
 
In sum, the claim that electoral institutions shape the campaign mobilisation effort is 
essentially contested and empirically less obvious than what is theorised. If the 
electoral architecture does indeed play a role in explaining variance in the campaign 
processes, the capacity of citizens to experience first-hand contact with political 
elites consequently varies, as does the nature of that contact. This has critical 
implications for political mobilisation and electoral participation. 
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Untangling the Relationship between Electoral Institutions and Campaigns 
We begin by identifying what might explain the existing inconsistency between the 
voter- and elite-side literatures. Conflicting findings on the effects of electoral 
institutions may be due to three reasons: here, we outline them and describe how our 
empirical strategy directly addresses them.  
 
First, comparative studies of the elite side have, so far, looked at European elections 
where variation in electoral set ups is limited, as all European Union member states 
must use some form of proportional representation. Accounting for a greater degree 
of variation in electoral set ups might be, therefore, necessary to uncover the effects 
of electoral institutions on FDQGLGDWHV¶ campaign behaviour. The CSS project, 
complemented with other compatible candidate surveys, covers a wide array of 
electoral mechanisms, including plurality systems. We implement a threefold 
strategy to systematically measure variation across the electoral systems and grasp 
their potential impact on campaign effort. First, we separately examine PR and SMD 
systems to explore whether candidates behave differently under these two broad 
electoral system families. This comparison will offer an initial indication of whether 
electoral institutions affect campaigning and electioneering. We then gauge more 
nuances of electoral institutions by using the index developed by Farrell and Scully¶V
seminal study.17 This modified version of the Carey and Shugart, and Shugart¶V, 
index,18 simultaneously accounts for the role of (a) ballot access, (b) vote choice, and 
(c) district type in shaping the electoral environment in which candidates compete. It 
exposes more of the nuances of the various electoral set ups than a simpler PR versus 
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SMD dichotomy. This is particularly relevant in light of the plethora of PR systems 
that are being used to elect MPs. Finally, we focus on the effect of district magnitude 
and address its interplay with vote choice. The assumption here is that candidates¶ 
campaign behaviour is influenced by whether voters can cast personal/preference 
votes, with the district size acting as a moderator.19 
 
Second, measurement issues in the dependent variable may be responsible for the 
lack of findings from studies of the second-order European elections. For example, 
the analysis by Giebler and Wüst is limited to overall campaign effort in terms of the 
time and money spent by candidates, which does not necessarily account for the 
complexity of their campaign effort. In order to address this shortfall, we use a wider 
collection of information on the FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUW,QDGGLWLRQWRFDSWXULQJ
the intensity of their campaign ± the time spent campaigning ±, we also account for 
the complexity of their campaign effort by exploring the range of communication 
channels used to reach potential voters. In other words, we gauge ERWKWKHµTXDQWLW\¶
and WKHµTXDOLW\¶RIthe FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUW  
 
Finally, the mismatch between findings from the voter and elite side of the electoral 
equation may be due to the level of election that these studies have focused on. 
While the former are based on first-order parliamentary elections, the latter are, to 
date, limited to second-order European elections. Our study allows for the 
comparison of findings from the supply and demand sides within the same type of 
election, which is pivotal to resolving the unsettled incongruence. 
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Hypotheses 
Bowler and Farrell conclude that regardless of the electoral incentives in place, 
candidates work equally hard to get elected.20 This casts doubt on whether electoral 
institutions differ in their capacity to mobilise voters. We treat this claim as a null 
hypothesis.  
 
Electoral campaigns are the effort put in place by candidates and parties to win 
votes. From a rational choice theory perspective, it is reasonable to imagine that the 
rules of the game affect the behaviour of the players: candidate-centred electoral 
mechanisms should put a stronger onus on individuals to promote their candidacy. 
7KH OLQN EHWZHHQ RQH¶V FDPSDLJQ DFWLYLW\ ± effort and focus ± and electoral 
performance is simply more direct under these rules. The necessity to maximise 
personal reputation and profile, and to establish personal ties with constituents, is 
more salient and clear-cut in a system that rewards personal/preference votes. 
 
This should be reflected in the amount of time and the type of resources that 
candidates invest in their campaign. For example, tKH XWLOLW\ RI SURPRWLQJ RQH¶V
candidacy can reasonably be seen as high for candidates in systems like the Irish PR-
STV or the Estonian open list PR where all contenders have, in principle, an equal 
chance of being chosen by voters. Conversely, candidates in systems such as the 
Portuguese closed list PR are undoubtedly less likely to find the motivation to put in 
an equally high level of campaign effort as it is ultimately the party vote, rather than 
the personal vote, that shapes the electoral outcome. The link between an individual 
FDQGLGDWH¶V campaign effort and her electoral performance is simply not as clear-cut 
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in party-centred electoral systems as it is in candidate-centred ones. For example, 
thinking again about the Portuguese case, candidates at the top of their party list can 
reasonably expect to get elected irrespective of their own campaign effort. At the 
same time, there are no clear personal benefits associated with stronger campaign 
effort for candidates placed at the bottom of their party list. In party-centred systems, 
the utility of personal campaign effort is lower than in candidate-centred systems.  
 
In addition to the effect associated with electoral rules, district magnitude is likely to 
affect campaign behaviour, on its own and in tandem with the institutional set up on 
candidate choice options. Identifying the target YRWHUV WRFRQWDFWDQGPDNLQJRQH¶V
presence visible is simpler in small districts.21 Therefore, lower district magnitude 
should encourage candidates to seek out direct contact with voters, while larger 
district magnitude should push them to rely more on their party image and exert less 
personal effort. However, the effects of the district size on the campaign effort are 
likely to be conditioned by whether voters cast their ballot for candidates or parties. 
If candidates compete for personal votes ± that is, ballots are cast for candidates ±, 
they simply cannot afford to rely merely on their party image, even when standing in 
a large constituency where establishing direct contact with voters is difficult. In these 
contexts, candidates face competition from co-partisans and are under more pressure 
to distinguish themselves from others. Therefore, the effect of district magnitude on 
campaign effort should be moderated by whether voters cast their ballot for parties 
or candidates. Based on these considerations, we formalise the following hypothesis: 
H1: Electoral institutions significantly affect campaign effort in the following 
ways: (a) candidate-centred electoral systems promote greater campaign 
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effort than party-centred systems; (b) district magnitude has a negative effect 
on campaign effort; and (c) this is weaker in systems where voters cast their 
ballot for candidates as opposed to parties. 
 
Another element of campaigning that is reasonably related to the structure of the 
electoral institutions is the focus of the FDQGLGDWHV¶message. All candidates seek to 
JHWRXWWKHYRWHDQGZLQYRWHUV¶FKRLFHin the polling booth, but they can choose to 
do so by putting more (or less) emphasis on themselves (versus their party). Again, 
the rules of the game should impact the SOD\HUV¶ EHKDYLRXU Bowler and Farrell 
introduce ³DFRQFHSWXDOGLVWLQFWLRQUHVHUYLQJWKHWHUPµHOHFWLRQHHULQJ¶IRUWKHNLQGV
RIDFWVWKDWJHWSHRSOHRXWWRYRWHDQGXVLQJWKHWHUPµFDPSDLJQLQJ¶WRUHIHUWRWKH
strategy at election time with regard to campaign goals (maximise party as opposed 
WR LQGLYLGXDO YRWH VKDUH´. 22  Building on this, we expand our assessment of 
FDQGLGDWHV¶ FDPSDLJQ EHKDYLRXU to explore whether electoral institutions influence 
the extent to which candidacy is promoted encompassing or bypassing the party.  
 
While the expectations here are theoretically intuitive ± party-oriented campaigns 
should prevail in party-centred electoral set ups like closed list PR, and candidate-
focused campaigning should take place in systems such as open list PR and SMD ±, 
empirical evidence is still unsystematic. =LWWHODQG*VFKZHQG¶V study of the German 
mixed system indicates that electoral incentives affect the candidates¶ FDPSDLJQ
objectives,23 but is limited to one country with consequent narrow external validity. 
A series of case studies in ColoPHU¶V FROOHFWLRQ LV offering further support for the 
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underlying intuition, but does not provide comparable or comparative assessment.24 
Counter-intuitively, Marsh finds that under the Irish PR-STV system ± one of the 
most candidate-centred electoral mechanisms ± campaigns are candidate-centred, as 
one would expect, but still remain ³SDUW\-ZUDSSHG´25 Moreover, we still do not 
know how district magnitude affects ± directly and conditionally ± the link between 
electoral institutions and campaigning. Following above-mentioned considerations 
on how larger district magnitudes should push candidates to rely more on their party 
image, particularly where voters cast party-based (versus candidate-based) votes, we 
expect district magnitude WRVKDSHFDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQIRFXV. Formally, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Electoral institutions significantly affect campaign focus in the following 
ways: (a) candidate-centred electoral systems promote a more candidate-
centred campaign focus; (b) district magnitude has a negative effect on 
candidate-focused campaigning; and (c) this is weaker in systems where 
voters cast their ballot for candidates as opposed to parties.  
 
Data and Measures 
We evaluate our theoretical expectations on a unique collection of information on 
candidates running at first-order parliamentary elections. 26  The CCS project, 
bringing together a wide range of national candidate studies and using a common 
core questionnaire to allow for cross-country comparisons, is the main source of this 
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information. To further maximise the array of electoral institutions under study, we 
combine the CCS data ± version 2013AF2 ± with additional survey data from 
countries not included in the project.27  As a result, we have information on the 
campaign activity of candidates from fifteen different countries.28 With the same key 
questions asked in a large pool of countries, it offers the first opportunity to extend 
the analysis of how electoral institutions influence the campaign behaviour of 
candidates to first-order parliamentary elections.29  
 
Dependent Variables 
In line with our theoretical approach, we identify survey measures that tap into the 
different strategic choices associated with electioneering and campaigning. Starting 
with the former, we implement a dual operationalisation. Our µquantitative¶ measure 
of campaign effort describes how many hours per week each candidate spent on her 
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campaign during the last month leading up to the election, ranging from 0 to 70.30 
This is preferred to campaign spending ± which is extensively used as a proxy of 
campaign effort ± as candidates were considerably less inclined to self-report their 
expenditure in the surveys. The number of hours ± measured on an open scale ± 
reduces the amount of missing values and moderates concerns about misreporting, 
while still representing a highly adequate and widely used proxy for the overall 
LQWHQVLW\RIRQH¶Vcampaign effort.31 To better gauge the concept of campaign effort, 
we complement WKHµTXDQWLWDWLYH¶PHDVXUHZLWKDQLQGH[(ranging from 0 to 5) that 
captures the complexity of DFDQGLGDWH¶Vcampaign effort, tapping into its µTXDOLW\¶,W
describes how many campaign activities, from the following options, each candidate 
used as part of her campaign: i) canvassing, ii) direct mail, iii) online campaigning, 
iv) newspaper interviews, and v) TV interviews. These options not only maximise 
the amount of cases for analysis but also account for the different types of effort, 
including localised door-to-door direct contact with voters as well as both traditional 
and new media forms of campaign advertisement. This measure accounts for the 
complexity and richness of the campaign effort put in place by candidates in order to 
mobilise voters and seeks to provide evidence of whether voters are likely to 
experience various stimuli under different electoral rules.  
 
The benefit of the dual operationalisation is twofold. First, the two measures tap into 
slightly different aspects of the FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUWERWKRQ WKH WKHRUHWLFDO
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ground as well as empirically, correlating at 0.4 (p<0.001). While WKHµTXDQWLWDWLYH¶
measure remains an intuitive way of assessing how much an individual works to win 
a seat, per se it does not offer any nuances about the complexity of her campaign. In 
the context of post-modern campaigns ± where several targeting tools and contacting 
options are available ± candidates are compelled to fight on multiple fronts. The 
extent to which candidates decide to embed multiple communication channels into 
their campaigns is, therefore, crucial to defining the type, and scope, of the stimuli 
that voters experience before the election. One could indeed choose to spend a great 
amount of time on canvassing, but ignore other forms of contact. Therefore, our 
µTXDOLWDWLYH¶ PHDVXUH RIIHUV further insights into whether electoral system effects 
extend to shaping the choice of electioneering techniques. Second, the reliance on 
two indicators offers a robustness check as both measures, while describing different 
HOHPHQWVRIRQH¶VFDPSDLJQHIIRUWWDSLQWRWKHVDPHXQGHUO\LQJFRQFHSW  
 
With regard to campaigning, our dependent variable is labelled as campaign focus. It 
is based on a survey question directly addressing the primary aim of RQH¶V campaign. 
7KLVPHDVXUHUDQJHVIURPµto attract as much attention as possible to P\SDUW\¶WR
µWRDWWUDFWDVPXFKDWWHQWion as possible to PHDVDFDQGLGDWH¶RIIHULQJa unique 
comparative insight into the kind of messages that candidates convey to the 
electorate through their campaign effort.  
 
In Table 1, we show the averages and standard deviations per country for the three 
dependent variables. This offers an initial indication that electoral institutions might 
play a part in explaining this variation. For example, if we look at the most party- 
and candidate-centred PR systems ± that is, closed list PR (Portugal) and PR-STV 
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(Ireland) ±, we can appreciate some suggestive evidence for it. Candidates in Ireland, 
on average, engage in greater campaign effort in terms of time (45 versus 28 hours) 
as well as complexity (4.2 versus 2.5 in campaign activities) than those in Portugal, 
with the former also conduct more personalised campaigns (5.6 versus 1.7).32 That 
said, these differences may, of course, be due to some contextual elements and need 
to be assessed in a rigorous way, by including possible alternative explanations.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Campaign Effort and Campaign Focus 
 
Campaign Effort 
(Time) 
Campaign Effort 
(Complexity) Campaign Focus 
 
Mean (st.dev.)  Mean (st.dev.) 
Australia    
House 34.7 (17.1) 3.6 (1.6) 3.1 (3.1) 
Senate 28.8 (18.4) 0.0 (0.0) 1.3 (2.0) 
Canada 45.7 (20.2) 4.5 (0.9)  
Czech Republic 22.3 (19.1)  2.7 (2.8) 
Denmark 35.3 (19.3) 3.2 (1.2) 4.1 (3.3) 
Estonia 13.9 (14.9)  3.8 (3.1) 
Finland 25.0 (19.7) 1.7 (1.1) 4.2 (3.1) 
Germany 49.5 (9.9) 4.6 (0.7) 4.4 (3.3) 
Greece 30.8 (23.0) 4.0 (0.9) 3.9 (2.3) 
Iceland 19.2 (17.8) 1.8 (1.3) 1.9 (2.9) 
Ireland 44.6 (18.5) 4.2 (1.0) 5.6 (3.0) 
Netherlands 21.9 (18.1) 3.1 (1.6) 2.0 (2.5) 
Norway 20.3 (19.3) 1.9 (1.5) 1.3 (2.1) 
Poland 31.0 (17.8) 2.7 (1.4) 4.7 (3.3) 
Portugal 27.5 (20.4) 2.5 (1.4) 1.7 (2.2) 
Switzerland 12.7 (11.8) 2.3 (1.7) 3.4 (2.7) 
Note: calculated based on samples used in Model 1, Model 4, and Model 7. 
 
Key Explanatory Variables and Controls 
We rely on survey data from a diverse set of countries, covering a variety of 
electoral institutions and district magnitudes.33 Among these countries, Canada uses 
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SMD to elect all members to the House of Commons, while Australia and Germany 
use SMD to elect a portion of legislators.34 This enables us to start by looking at the 
differences in the FDQGLGDWHV¶campaign activity under SMD versus PR. This initial 
comparison is straightforward and we capture it by coding candidates who stood in a 
SMD system DVµ¶ and those who stood in D35V\VWHPDVµ¶ This offers a first, if 
raw, indication of whether electoral set ups affect campaigning and electioneering.  
 
To better gauge the nuances, we then classify electoral systems following the 
seminal study of Farrell and Scully35 where the concept of electoral incentives is 
operationalised as the cumulative score of: 
i) Ballot access: the degree of party versus voter control over the ballot 
placement of candidates, ranging from 1 to 3. 
ii) Vote choice: the extent to which voters are able to vote for a specific 
candidate, ranging from 1 to 4.  
iii) District: the effect of a district type on the importance of personal 
reputation, ranging from 1 to 2. 
                                                                                                                                                            
candidates. In-between we have PR systems where voters cast their ballot for the party with an option 
to alter candidate rankings (Iceland), where they cast preference votes with an option to vote for the 
party ticket (Australian Senate), and where they can cast either a candidate or a party vote (Denmark). 
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Higher scores across these components are indicative of a candidate-centred 
electoral system. Therefore, the overall index ranges from 3 to 9, with higher values 
corresponding to greater incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote.36 
 
As the final, yet potentially important, element of the electoral set up, we explore the 
role of the district magnitude in influencing the FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQEHKDYLRXU37 
We do so by looking at whether the district magnitude has a direct, independent 
effect on campaign behaviour, but also whether its effect is being conditioned by 
vote choice. The value of personal reputation should decline as district magnitude 
increases in systems where voters cast party-based votes such as closed list PR, 
whereas it should increase as district magnitude increases in systems where voters 
cast candidate-based votes such as open list PR. The measure is operationalised as 
the natural logarithm of the number of seats allocated in the constituency.38 The use 
                                                        
36
 See the online appendix Table A1 for a detailed breakdown of how the different countries and their 
electoral systems are coded. 
37
 We also ran models where district magnitude was not used alongside smd and electoral incentives. 
Estimates from these models are in line with the findings reported here and available upon request. 
38
 We acknowledge that population density would be a more fine-grained measure to address the 
impact RIWKHGLVWULFWVL]HRQWKHFDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQVWUDWHJ\*HRJUDSKLFDOGDWDWRV\VWHPDWLFDOO\
match constituencies in our data with information on population density is, however, not available. 
That said, district magnitude does represent a good alternative for capturing the district size effect. As 
noted by Taagepera and Shugart (1989), district magnitude is calibrated on district size where size 
³UHIHUVWRWKHQXPEHURIYRWHUVLQDQHOHFWRUDOGLVWULFWRUWKHJHRJUDSKLFDOH[WHQWRIDGLVWULFW´ 
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of a natural logarithm is the conventional practice,39 and particularly useful to correct 
the skewed nature of the district magnitude in our data.40 
 
Finally, we control for several elements that previous studies have shown to be 
relevant to explaining campaign effort and focus.41 First and foremost, we account 
for campaign marginality ± that is, the chance of being elected. Clearly, the higher 
the foreseen chance of success, the stronger the incentive for electioneering. 
Moreover, candidates who believe that they are unlikely to get elected are likely to 
put less effort into their own campaign and opt for a more party-focused campaign 
strategy to build a profile within their party, with consequent implications for 
campaigning. We operationalise the likelihood of success as the candidates¶ VHOI-
perceived likelihood of success before their campaign started, ranging from 1 µI 
could not win¶ to 5 µI could not lose¶. Second, the nature of WKHFDQGLGDWH¶VFDPSDLJQ
may be influenced by her relationship with her party. Namely, the further away a 
candidate¶s own positions are from those of her party, the more likely she is to 
conduct a campaign with a personalised focus and to put in extra campaign effort to 
get her own political views across. We measure ideological distance as the absolute 
difference between the left-right position of the candidate and that of her party (as 
perceived by the candidate). It ranges from 0 µno difference¶ WR  µPD[LPXP
GLIIHUHQFH¶. Left-right placement is not only the most comparable measure for a 
study of this sort, but also the best available shortcut for aggregating multiple policy 
                                                        
39
 Benoit 2002. 
40
 Our sample includes data from the Netherlands where all 150 House of Representatives seats are 
allocated in a single nation-wide constituency. 
41
 Bowler and Farrell 2011; Gibson and McAllister 2006; Zittel and Gschwend 2008; Zittel 2009. 
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positions.42 Third, we look at the FDQGLGDWHV¶SROLWLFDOH[SHULHQFHE\DFFRXQWLQJIRU
incumbency (past MP) and their position within the party (party hierarchy). Past MP 
is coded 1 if the candidate has been a member of parliament before and 0 if not, and 
party hierarchy is coded 1 if she has held national party office or been employed by 
it and 0 if not. We expect candidates with such experience to undertake more 
intensive and personalised campaigns. Fourth, we control for the cDQGLGDWHV¶
proximity to voters by separating those living in the constituency where they stand 
for election (coded 1) from the rest (coded 0) on the premise that the former are 
more invested in constituency matters and, therefore, push harder to get elected 
through a stronger campaign effort and more personalised campaign focus.43 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Given the different data structure of our dependent variables, different estimation 
techniques are used to analyse variation in the different aspects of campaign 
behaviour. With regard to the µquantitative¶ measure of electioneering, time, we use 
OLS, as the dependent variable is measured in hours per week. Similarly, OLS is 
implemented to empirically address campaign focus. Conversely, the µqualitative¶ 
index of campaign effort is analysed using ordered probit, given the structure of the 
variable. In line with the key explanatory elements described above, we run three 
sets of models for each dependent variable: the first set (Models 1, 4, and 7) accounts 
for electoral mechanisms by using the simple plurality dummy, the second set 
(Models 2, 5, and 8) uses the electoral incentives index, and the final third set 
(Models 3, 6, and 9) explores the interactive effects of district magnitude and vote 
                                                        
42
 Benoit and Laver 2007. 
43
 Górecki and Marsh 2012; Górecki and Marsh 2014. 
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choice. Finally, model specifications take into account the country-specific contexts 
of electoral politics; therefore, we include country dummies as a control.44  This 
accounts for any country-specific effects beyond the electoral institutions. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
We begin by addressing the effects of electoral institutions on electioneering. The 
first set of models (1-3), reported in Table 2, explain variation in campaign effort 
(time). In line with our theoretical expectations, candidate-centred electoral systems 
seem to provide an incentive for candidates to campaign harder. The coefficient of 
SMD in Model 1 shows a difference of 11 hours per week between plurality and PR 
systems as the former produce higher intensity campaign effort. When we look at 
more nuances of the electoral mechanisms in Model 2, we observe an average 
increase of 3 hours per week in campaign effort as we move from those who have 
weaker systemic incentives to cultivate a personal vote to those who have stronger 
incentives to do so. Consistently across the different models, a significant effect of 
electoral institutions exists on the LQWHQVLW\RIFDQGLGDWHV¶campaign effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
44
 We prefer this approach to multi-level modelling as the structure of the data does not satisfy the 
30/30 rule (see Kreft 1996). Estimates from multi-level models that have countries as a Level-2 
variable are, however, similar to the findings reported here and presented in the online appendix Table 
A3. We also ran multi-level models with parties as a Level-2 variable; their estimates are in line with 
the findings reported here and presented in the online appendix Table A4. 
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Table 2. Explaining Variation in Campaign Effort (Time) 
 Campaign Effort (Time) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SMD 10.87* (5.40)   
Electoral Incentives  2.72* (1.35)  
District Magnitude -1.23** (0.37) -1.23** (0.37)  
Personal Vote * DM    
Personal Vote (1)   -2.98* (1.21) 
Personal Vote (2)   -1.90 (1.43) 
Personal Vote (3)   -1.71** (0.39) 
Personal Vote (4)   1.48 (1.05) 
Likelihood of Success 3.84** (0.25) 3.84** (0.25) 3.82** (0.25) 
Ideological Distance 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 
Past MP 2.85** (0.96) 2.85** (0.96) 2.76** (0.96) 
Party Hierarchy 3.45** (0.56) 3.45** (0.56) 3.45** (0.56) 
Constituency -0.28 (1.07) -0.28 (1.07) -0.38 (1.08) 
Constant 14.03* (5.45) 0.45 (12.09) 24.48** (1.49) 
Country fixed-effects yes yes yes 
Countries 15 15 15 
Observations 5158 5158 5158 
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Personal vote: (1) ± vote for list only; (2) ± vote for list or candidate, list vote dominates; 
(3) vote for list or candidate, candidate vote dominates; (4) vote for candidate only. 
 
Table 2 also shows that district magnitude has a negative effect on the dependent 
variable. A shift from the smallest to the largest constituency corresponds to a 6 
hours per week decline in FDQGLGDWHV¶SUHGLFWHG campaign effort (based on estimates 
in Models 1 and 2). As indicated by Model 3, the negative effect of district 
magnitude is, however, influenced by vote choice. It is strongest in electoral systems 
where voters are required to cast their ballot for a party list. Clearly, the extent to 
which electoral mobilisation is promoted WKURXJK FDQGLGDWHV¶ FDPSDLJQ HIIRUW is 
substantially different across the various electoral systems. The more candidate-
centred the electoral set up, and the smaller the district magnitude, the higher the 
intensity RIFDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUWceteris paribus.  
 
As expected, however, campaign effort is not just a function of the electoral set up. 
At the individual level, we find that candidates who are confident in their electoral 
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chances ahead of their campaign conduct significantly higher intensity campaigns 
than candidates who did not expect to get elected. Predicted campaign effort rises 
from 18 hours per week for candidates who thought that they had no chance of 
getting elected to 34 hours per week for candidates who felt certain to get elected 
prior to campaigning. In addition, small positive effects ± that is, around 3 hours per 
week ± are associated with both political experience variables. At the same time, we 
do not find ideological distance or proximity to voters to play a significant role in 
affecting how much time candidates choose to spend on their campaign. 
 
With regard to the TXDOLWDWLYHPHDVXUHRIFDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQHIIRUWwe find that 
the same patterns are visible when explaining the complexity of the FDQGLGDWHV¶
campaign effort (Table 3). In line with our theoretical expectations, candidates in 
SMD systems tend to use a wider range of campaign activities than their 
counterparts in PR systems, while the positive effect associated with electoral 
incentives indicates that candidates undertake more complex campaigns when the 
electoral set up offers stronger incentives to cultivate a personal vote. In addition, 
larger district magnitude coincides with the use of a narrower range of campaign 
activities and the largest negative effect is again observed in electoral systems where 
voters have to cast their ballot for a party list. These findings are in line with what 
we observed when looking at the µTXDQWLWDWLYH¶ DVSHFW RI FDPSDLJQ HIIRUW, re-
affirming that higher levels of campaign effort are associated with more candidate-
centred electoral set ups and smaller district magnitudes. 
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Table 3. Explaining Variation in Campaign Effort (Complexity) 
 Campaign Effort (Complexity) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SMD 6.05** (0.28)   
Electoral Incentives  1.51** (0.07)  
District Magnitude -0.09* (0.03) -0.09* (0.03)  
Personal Vote * DM    
Personal Vote (1)   -0.24** (0.08) 
Personal Vote (2)   -0.03 (0.13) 
Personal Vote (3)   -0.13** (0.05) 
Personal Vote (4)   0.15** (0.06) 
Likelihood of Success 0.21** (0.02) 0.21** (0.02) 0.21** (0.02) 
Ideological Distance 0.05* (0.02) 0.05* (0.02) 0.05* (0.02) 
Past MP 0.27** (0.06) 0.27** (0.06) 0.28** (0.06) 
Party Hierarchy 0.31** (0.05) 0.31** (0.05) 0.31** (0.05) 
Constituency 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.08 (0.02) 
/cut1 4.60 (0.24) 12.16 (0.60) -1.42 (0.17) 
/cut2 5.43 (0.24) 12.99 (0.60) -0.59 (0.17) 
/cut3 6.07 (0.25) 13.63 (0.60) 0.05 (0.17) 
/cut4 6.61 (0.25) 14.17 (0.60) 0.60 (0.17) 
/cut5 7.01 (0.25) 14.57 (0.60) 1.00 (0.17) 
Country fixed-effects yes yes yes 
Countries 13 13 13 
Observations 3032 3032 3032 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4813 -4813 -4809 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Personal vote: (1) ± vote for list only; (2) ± vote for list or candidate, list vote dominates; 
(3) vote for list or candidate, candidate vote dominates; (4) vote for candidate only. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects associated with electoral institutions, showing how 
FDQGLGDWHV¶ likelihood of undertaking campaigns of high and low complexity is 
conditioned by electoral incentives (Figure 1a) and district magnitude (Figure 1b). 
Figure 1a highlights well how the probability of high campaign complexity ± that is, 
maximum score for campaign complexity ± increases as we move from a party-
centred electoral system to a candidate-centred one, while the opposite is true for 
FDQGLGDWHV¶ OLNHOLKRRGRI conducting low complexity campaigns. In a similar vein, 
Figure 1b shows that the effects of district magnitude go in the opposite direction. 
While lower district magnitude leads to a higher likelihood of implementing a broad 
array of campaign tools, larger districts depress the use of multiple campaign tools. 
These effects are, however, of notably smaller scale. A shift from the smallest to 
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largest district brings about an 8% increase in FDQGLGDWHV¶ likelihood of conducting a 
low complexity campaign (from 8% to 16%) and a 9% decline in their likelihood of 
conducting a high complexity campaign (from 24% to 15%). In sum, candidate-
centred electoral set ups and smaller district magnitudes tend to propel higher 
mobilisation efforts, in terms of campaign intensity as well as complexity. 
 
Figure 1. Effects of Electoral Institutions on Campaign Effort (Complexity) 
Figure 1a. Effect of Electoral Incentives on Campaign Effort (Complexity) 
 
Figure 1b. Effect of District Magnitude on Campaign Effort (Complexity) 
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When district magnitude and electoral incentives are looked at separately, we can 
appreciate their independent effects on campaign effort. When we assess their joint 
effects in Models 3 and 6, however, we find some evidence to confirm the intuition 
of Carey and Shugart that the incentives to cultivate a personal vote decline in closed 
list systems when district magnitude increases and that the opposite happens in open 
list systems.45 Nevertheless, there is not sufficient proof that such interactions exist: 
while the direction of the coefficients is in line with the expectations, the associated 
confidence intervals overlap in Model 3 and the significance of certain categories in 
Model 6 have little meaningful value.46 
 
Having seen how HOHFWRUDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DIIHFW ERWK WKH µTXDQWLW\¶ and µTXDOLW\¶ RI
campaign effort, we move to assessing whether the electoral set up also has an effect 
on the extent to which the FDQGLGDWHV¶ FDPSDLJQ PHVVDJHV IRFXV RQ WKHPVHOYHV
versus their party. Table 4 presents the outputs from the analyses of campaign focus. 
The findings are clear and consistent: candidate-centred electoral set ups incentivise 
candidates to opt for a more candidate-focused campaign strategy. The coefficient of 
SMD in Model 7 shows a 2.2-point difference between SMD and PR systems, with 
the former producing more personalised electoral campaigns. When looking at 
electoral systems in a more nuanced manner in Model 8, we observe an average 0.6-
point increase in the extent to which candidates prioritise their own (versus party) 
image when we move from those who have weaker systemic incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote to those who have stronger incentives to do so. While quite modest in 
                                                        
45
 Carey and Shugart 1995. 
46
 Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004. 
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size, the effect is robust across the different specifications of the key independent 
variable. On the contrary, the evidence that the district magnitude has an effect on 
campaign focus is limited. We do not observe a significant independent effect for 
district magnitude in Models 7 and 8, with a significant negative effect being present 
only when focusing on two categories of vote choice in Model 9. Once again, the 
evidence of a potential interaction effect between electoral incentives and district 
magnitude, albeit in line with the expectations, is empirically weak. 
 
Table 4. Explaining Variation in Campaign Focus 
 Campaign Focus 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
SMD 2.21** (0.56)   
Electoral Incentives  0.55** (0.14)  
District Magnitude -0.04 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06)  
Personal Vote * DM    
Personal Vote (1)   -.23* (0.11) 
Personal Vote (2)   -.37* (0.16) 
Personal Vote (3)   -.07 (0.08) 
Personal Vote (4)   .14 (0.14) 
Likelihood of Success 0.64** (0.03) 0.64** (0.03) .64** (0.03) 
Ideological Distance 0.22** (0.03) 0.22** (0.03) .21** (0.03) 
Past MP -0.00 (0.12) -0.00 (0.12) -.03 (0.12) 
Party Hierarchy -0.09 (0.08) -0.09 (0.08) -.09 (0.08) 
Constituency 0.06 (0.13) 0.06 (0.13) .04 (0.13) 
Constant -0.71 (0.56) -3.48** (1.24) 1.44** (0.20) 
Country fixed-effects yes yes yes 
Countries 14 14 14 
Observations 6375 6375 6375 
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Personal vote: (1) ± vote for list only; (2) ± vote for list or candidate, list vote dominates; 
(3) vote for list or candidate, candidate vote dominates; (4) vote for candidate only. 
 
At the individual level, we find that candidates who are more confident in their 
electoral chances conduct more candidate-focused campaigns, as do those who feel 
ideologically more distant from their party. At the same time, there is no evidence 
 28 
that the candidaWHV¶Srevious political experience or proximity to voters plays a role 
in influencing their campaign focus. 
 
In summary, the empirical analysis indicates clearly that electoral institutions are 
significant predictors for electioneering practices after all, leading to the rejection of 
the claim that candidates work equally hard irrespective of the electoral system type. 
However, when it comes to assessing the effects of electoral institutions on 
campaigning, the evidence is more multifaceted. More candidate-centred electoral 
systems do lead to more personalised campaign messages as expected, but district 
magnitude does not have an independent effect on the campaign focus. A significant 
negative effect for the district magnitude is only found where voters either have to or 
tend to cast their ballot for a party. No matter how large (or small) the district, 
candidates concentrate on promoting their own personal image if the electoral set up 
encourages or requires voters to cast personal/preference votes. 
  
The disjuncture between previous findings from the elite side and the voter side 
literature is resolved when looking at the first-order parliamentary elections, and 
when the complexity of electioneering and campaigning are taken into account.  
 
Conclusions 
In this article we have explored the effects of electoral institutions on the campaign 
behaviour of candidates running for office at first-order parliamentary elections. 
While studies of the European elections have provided us with valuable insights into 
the impact of electoral institutions on individual-level campaigning during second-
order elections, we have taken a first step to extend this type of analysis to the arena 
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that still remains most crucial for political competition among candidates and parties, 
as well as for the voters. Our study contributes to the wider debate on the role of 
electoral institutions in promoting political engagement and voter mobilisation by 
showing that smaller districts in candidate-centred electoral systems maximise the 
likelihood of voters experiencing higher intensity campaigns. 
 
Campaigns provide voters with the knowledge they need to make an informed vote 
choice and increase the likelihood of electoral participation.47 The engineering of 
electoral institutions is often inspired by considerations on what systemic effects 
electoral rules will produce. Here, we have shed some light on the strategic effects of 
electoral institutions by showing that electoral systems have an independent impact 
on elite-level behaviour. Where electoral rules allow for candidate-based vote 
choice(s), candidates tend to put forward more intense and complex campaign efforts 
as well as campaign along less partisan lines. This goes hand in hand with what is 
found by studies of electoral institutions and styles of representation,48 but against 
what we know from studies of second-order elections, as the latter have pointed to a 
weak link between electoral institutions and the FDQGLGDWHV¶campaign behaviour. 
 
Our study can reconcile the supply, elite side with what is observed by voter studies, 
suggesting that the second-order European elections may not be the best venue for 
exploring the effects of electoral institutions, as they are likely to be masked by little 
variation in the independent variables and limited in the sample of candidates. The 
cross-national CCS project, taken together with other compatible candidate surveys, 
                                                        
47
 Green, Aronow, and McGrath 2013; Green and Gerber 2008; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006. 
48
 Carey 2007; Olivella and Tavits 2014. 
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can overcome the limits of our current understanding of parliamentary candidates¶ 
campaign behaviour, their intentions and attitudes. This collection of candidate 
studies enables us to extend the analysis of how electoral institutions influence 
FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQEHKDYLRXUWRILUVW-order parliamentary elections. In addition, it 
offers nuances on how candidates mobilise voters by JRLQJEH\RQGYRWHUV¶UHSRUWHG
contact. Voter studies usually rely on questions on door-to-door and/or telephone 
contact,49 leaving aside the more recent and upcoming forms of campaign tools like 
contact via Internet. Our qualitative measure of electioneering encompasses a wide 
array of means which candidates may use to reach the voters. 
 
We find that electoral institutions do shape the FDQGLGDWHV¶ FDPSDLJQEHKDYLRXU LQ
the run up to first-order parliamentary elections, both in terms of campaign effort 
and campaign focus. The extent to which voters are likely to experience campaign 
stimuli LVFORVHO\UHODWHGWRHOHFWRUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDVFDQGLGDWHV¶campaign effort tends 
to be more intense, as well as complex, under candidate-centred electoral institutions 
than under party-centred ones. Equally, candidates seem to tailor their campaign 
message to the electoral context, as the extent to which it tends to be candidate-
focused is greater under candidate-centred electoral set ups. While the debate on the 
personalisation of electoral campaigns has, to date, focused mostly on the role of 
party leaders, this indicates that it should also feature the candidate side more 
prominently. All in all, the findings suggest that the impact of electoral institutions 
on campaigns is more far-reaching than what the state of the art describes. Both the 
amount and type of campaign stimuli that voters tend to experience is closely related 
to electoral institutions. 
                                                        
49
 Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008. 
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In sum, our findings broaden the understanding of how electoral institutions affect 
campaign practices in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections. It is generally 
accepted that electoral campaigns are shaped by country-specific dynamics as well 
as party- and candidate-specific characteristics. The empirical evidence offered here 
adds electoral institutions to this list. 
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